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From Entitlement to Contract:
Reshaping the Welfare State in Australia
RICHARD WEATHERLEY
University of Washington
Australia has sought to contain social welfare expenditures through more
stringent targeting of benefits, increased scrutiny of applicants, and by
requiring more vigorous job search and training activities. The changes
implemented since the Labor Party assumed office in 1983 represent the
most sweeping restructuring of the Australian welfare state in 50 years.
They mark a shift from an individualistic, rights-based view of welfare
state entitlements to one stressing reciprocal obligations. This article
examines the origin and implications of this reshaping of Australia's
welfare state programs. It considers the dilemmas of enforcing work-
related obligations and other compliance measures in an era of persistent,
high unemployment.
As the Clinton administration ponders it's committment to
welfare reform, it might well consider the experience of Aus-
tralia. Like many other industrialized nations, a lagging econ-
omy has prompted a reassessment of Australia's welfare state
programs and services. The governing Australian Labor Party
(ALP) has sought to reduce expenditures without alienating it's
electoral base among low income constituents. This article de-
scribes and assesses these reforms.
Australia has conventionally been labelled a welfare lag-
gard, along with the U.S. and Japan, because of its low wel-
fare expenditures, categorical, means-tested programs, low tax
revenue base and its relative lateness in initiating welfare state
programs in comparison with continental European nations
(Castles and Dowrick, 1990; Esping-Anderson, 1990). Deborah
Mitchell (1990), using data from the Luxembourg Income Study,
however, has shown that Australia compares much more
favourably on measures of poverty relief and income replace-
ment when taxation is also taken into account, a view supported
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by other analysts (Cass, 1989; Gruen, 1989). An observer from
the U.S. cannot help but be struck by Australia's much broader
coverage and higher benefit levels, except for aged pensions.
While many services had previously been provided by in-
dividual states, the Australian national welfare state dates back
to the 1940s. The Commonwealth Department of Social Services
was established in 1941; a series of national welfare measures-
widows' pensions, the child endowment, unemployment and
sickness benefits were adopted over the next few years and
were brought together in the Social Services Consolidation Act
of 1947 (Watts, 1987). The Commonwealth presently provides
"pensions" for the aged, disabled, widowed, sole parents and
carers of handicapped persons; and "benefits", intended to be
of temporary duration, for the unemployed, and the sick; and
"special benefits" for those in financial hardship not eligible for
any other categorical program. There is a family allowance and
family allowance supplement for families of low income work-
ers, Austudy stipends for full time students, a young homeless
allowance, and a job search allowance for unemployed 16 and
17 year olds. Low income families may also qualify for rental
assistance and child care fee relief; and pensioners also receive
concessions for things like public transport, telephone and phar-
maceuticals. These programs are all means-tested, and except
for the family allowance, subject to an assets test as well. Pen-
sion and benefit payment levels are indexed for inflation and
pegged at about 24 per cent of the average male wage which
places them at about the poverty line. There is also a universal
health care program, Medicare.
The Development of the Australian Welfare State
It might seem paradoxical that the world's first Labor party,
backed by a strong labour movement would countenance what
many describe as a residual welfare state. The Australian Labor
party (ALP) was formed in 1890, but despite its mass work-
ing class base, it has governed nationally only 28 of the 90
years since federation, 11 of which have been during the current
Hawke-Keating regime. The Labor Party, however, has had con-
siderable influence on public policy, even when in opposition
(Castles, 1985).
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Lenin, in 1913, characterised the party as liberal bourgeois,
representing non socialist trade union workers. Until the 1960s,
the ALP was committed to achieving greater social and eco-
nomic equality and security. The trade union movement and the
party were, however, more concerned about wages and working
conditions, protecting domestic industry, and restricting immi-
gration than welfare state benefits (Jaensch, 1989).
Australia, once known as "the working man's paradise",
benefited historically from relatively high wages and a com-
pressed distribution between high and low earners. A unique
feature of Australia's approach to dealing with class/industrial
conflict was the system of compulsory wage arbitration. In the
1907 Harvester Judgement, the President of the Arbitration
Court ruled that wages were to be set at a level deemed suffi-
cient to provide a "civilized life" for the wage earner, his wife,
and three children. Wage disputes were subject to compulsory
arbitration, and wages were to be adjusted to keep up with the
cost of living, though this basic wage did not become standard
until the 1920s. Under this system, the poor were those outside
the labour force, and especially large families of wage earners.
This "wage-earners welfare state" worked reasonably well for
the majority, except during times of high unemployment, as
with the depression (Castles, 1985). As Castles observed about
the selectivity of Australian welfare state programs: "If wages
were fair and reasonable, it would only be the improvident and
those unusually circumstanced who would require help." (1985,
p. 99). This emphasis on the male wage earner as provider also
biased policies against women; equal pay legislation was not
adopted until 1972. Current policies grant smaller benefits to
couples, and foster a bureaucratic preoccupation with defin-
ing and identifying "de facto" or "marriage like" relationships
(Bryson, 1984; Shaver, 1987).
The ALP maintained an ideological commitment to selectiv-
ity and means-testing as the best way to assist the poor until
the 1970s. Prior to the 1970s, social security was limited in scope
and administration. There was little outreach to inform citizens
about available programs and uptake was relatively low. The
small, residual social security system was to provide for those
in need because of death, disability or retirement of the primary
wage earner.
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A series of reforms under the Whitlam Labor Government,
1972-75, brought a shift to universalism, increased benefit lev-
els and a broadening of eligibility for means-tested programs.
A national health scheme was introduced, though it was subse-
quently eliminated by the conservative Fraser government. The
Whitlam era reforms were undertaken at the end of a long pe-
riod of economic expansion in a country that enjoyed a high
standard of living. Australia ranked 6th in per capita income
in the 1960s. In the two decades from 1951 to 1971, Australia
experienced an average annual increase in G.D.P. of 4.7 per cent
(Edwards, 1991) though per capita G.D.P. was much lower.
During the Whitlam era, the prevailing philosophy stressed
the awarding of entitlements with a minimum of delay or red
tape. Those working in the Department of Social Security at
the time summarise the prevailing attitude as one where it was
deemed better that several people get benefits to which they
were not entitled lest one needy person do without. The 1973 oil
shock, however, heralded an era of persistent high unemploy-
ment, growing inflation and welfare backlash. A welfare system
based on high wages and full employment was no longer viable
(Cass, 1988).
With the 1974-75 recession the Department of Social Secu-
rity was suddenly overwhelmed by unemployment applicants.
The watchword of the day was to get the money to the people
as quickly as possible. Staff struggled to keep up with the de-
mand. While payments had been automated from 1967, the cur-
rent technology required the manual batching of paper forms,
punching of computer cards, and feeding the cards through
a machine that would issue the cheques. With the limited re-
sources of the Department taxed to the extreme trying to keep
up issuing payments, there were neither the staff nor the man-
agement systems to ensure that the payments were issued only
to those truly eligible. It should be noted that tax avoidance
was also so rampant in the 1970s as to raise the prospect of it
becoming a "voluntary levy" (Wheelwright, 1990).
Under these circumstance, it was indeed likely that some
successfully claimed benefits to which they were not legally
entitled. In addition, a substantial residue of unemployment re-
mained in the wake of the two recessions of the 1970s leaving
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large numbers of persons claiming unemployment benefits in
the recovery periods. This enabled New Right politicians to ex-
ploit the issue of "dole bludgers"1 as part of their attack on the
welfare state. Such attacks may well have tapped into incipient
anti-migrant attitudes as well, especially given the Department
and media attention to social security scandals, like the 1978
"Greek doctor conspiracy", that seemed to target particular eth-
nic groups as responsible for social security fraud.2
The conservative Fraser government policy in the face of
the 1978-79 and 1982-83 recessions was to "fight inflation first"
and to cut unemployment benefits on the dubious theory that
this would create work incentives (Cass, 1989). Labor returned
to office in 1983 in the midst of the recession. The Labor gov-
ernment of Bob Hawke soon set about what became a major
reshaping of the welfare state, marked by increased means test-
ing and selectivity, as well as a restoration of national health
care and an increase in some benefit levels.
The Hawke Labor Government Reforms
The overall thrust of the reforms was in keeping with, and
influenced by, directions advocated by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD had
rejected labour market policies popular in the 1960s and 1970s
that sought to address unemployment through the creation of
public sector jobs or subsidies to private employers. Such poli-
cies didn't work, according to the OECD, because, "if the overall
demand for labour is depressed-perhaps as a result of macroe-
conomic policy-job creation initiatives at the micro level can
only redistribute the incidence of unemployment" (OECD, 1990,
pp 15-16). Furthermore, dealing with the consequences of un-
employment, i.e., through payment of unemployment benefits,
was insufficient. What was needed, according to the view that
gained ground in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were "... . fun-
damental changes in the institutions, attitudes and rules and
regulations governing the socioeconomic system in general, and
the labour market in particular.. ." (OECD, 1990, p. 16). This
meant reducing social expenditures and deregulating the labour
market to bring down labour costs and increase profits. Little
was heard of the goal of full employment.
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The OECD also stressed the notion of a "more active soci-
ety", a term that meant, depending on one's point of view, re-
inforcing individual initiative with respect to skills acquisition
and job search efforts; or conditioning cash payments on cer-
tain behavioural tests as a device for removing claimants from
the unemployment rolls. As the OECD noted, to break "depen-
dency cycles", it was necessary to promote "a spirit of active
job search" (OECD, 1990, pp. 3, 8). The problem of unemploy-
ment that had continued to plague many of the OECD countries
throughout the 1970s and 1980s was due in this formulation, not
to a lack of jobs, but to a lack of effort and preparation on the
part of the unemployed.
This view was consistent with the policies of Thatcher and
Reagan. Both leaders took steps to reduce the influence of labour
unions, constrain social expenditures and wages by limiting the
safety net for the unemployed and others outside the labour
force, the sick, disabled and dependent children. Workers would
be more inclined to accept lower wages if the alternative was
unemployment with subpoverty level subsistence payments, or
especially for many in the U.S., nothing at all.
While the policies of supply-side economics and an assault
on the welfare state were consistent with the conservative views
of Thatcher and Reagan, they seemed out of step with the Aus-
tralian Labor Party. Nevertheless, the Labor government suc-
ceeded in implementing a series of economic and welfare state
reforms that seemed to some, including those in Labor's left
faction, more in keeping with conservative trends than with
Labor's progressive tradition. Some observers noted a shift in
ALP philosophy and tactics to improve its electoral prospects, in
part to accommodate its traditional working class constituency's
entry into middle class status. The party had begun, in the
1960s, to favour growth and efficiency goals. The objective was
to manage capitalism through monetary and fiscal policy, pro-
moting equality of opportunity rather than equality of results.
In this view, the Whitlam government, in office from 1972-
75, represented a "technocratic labourism" designed to attract
middle class voters "alienated by labourism, Marxism and Ro-
man Catholicism" (Jaensch, 1989, p. 92). This signalled its trans-
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formation from a mass, collectivist party with a democratic/
centralist ethos and radical reformist ideology to a "catchall
party" with the prime objective of governing, a process com-
pleted with the Hawke-Keating governments' move to the right.
Just one month prior to the March 1983 elections that re-
turned Labor to office, the Labor Party and the Australian Coun-
cil of Trade Unions (ACTU) forged an Accord under which the
ACTU agreed to forgo wage increases and limit industrial dis-
putes in exchange for a promise of increases in the social wage-
tax cuts, health and welfare benefits, and lower interest rates.
The assumption was that lower labour costs would yield higher
profits which would lead to higher rates of employment and
improved living standards in the long run. The year following
Labor's 1983 election victory, the Age characterised the ALP as
"... the true pragmatic conservative party of government, the
heir to the Menzies tradition."3
At the time of the Accord, unemployment had reached its
then post war peak of 8.4 percent. (After declining to 6.2 per
cent in 1988, it rose above 10 per cent in 1991 where it cur-
rently remains.) The Hawke government carried out a series of
measures that reflected a pro-business stance stressing dereg-
ulation and competition, fiscal conservatism, privatisation and
user fees. They implemented tariff reductions ending protection
to domestic producers on the assumption that this would force
them to become more efficient and competitive in the world
market. They reduced government spending to levels, as a pro-
portion of GDP, of the early 1970s; government outlays fell from
36.9 percent of GDP in 1984-85 to 32.1 per cent in 1989 (Pusey,
1991, p. 3). They even balanced the budget in 1987 and pro-
duced a surplus until the recession that began in 1990 pushed
the budget into deficit once more. They put up for sale public
enterprises including Qantas and Australian Airlines, Telecom,
and the Commonwealth bank. They opened the country up to
foreign banks. And in a shift from party policy since the Whit-
lam era, they imposed fees for tertiary education and introduced
means-testing for old age pensions and family allowances. A
proposal for an "Australia Card", a national identity card, was
blocked in September 1987, but was reintroduced in the May
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1988 mini budget and adopted as a tax file number system that
the government said would save $2.1 billion in avoided revenue
over a ten year period (Maddox, 1989, p. 83).
Profits grew while real wages and unit labour costs fell to
levels lower than in the 1970s; and following the recovery be-
ginning in mid 1983, employment grew until 1990 when the
tight monetary policy undertaken to restrain inflation produced
what the then Treasury Minster, and current Prime Minister
Paul Keating described as "the recession we had to have".
Reflecting upon these changes, John Edwards (1991), who
served as a consultant in the office of Treasury Minister, Paul
Keating, gave this assessment:
The most striking aspect of the experience of economic policy in
Australia over the period was not so much its success or failure
as its improbability. No one could have forecast eight years ago
that a Labor government would encourage and enforce persistent
cuts in real wages, or that it would reduce the size of the federal
government relative to the economy, or that it would reverse a
long term trend of falling public saving, or that it would float the
Australian dollar and deregulate financial markets. All are changes
which would not have occurred without deliberate government
decision. In those respects the government has been able to move
further and faster than successive Republican administrations in
the US or the former Thatcher government in the UK in increasing
the profit share by containing wages, in cutting government, and
in increasing public saving until the 1990 recession. (p. 4).
Social security policy was a central concern of the Labor
government. A lagging economy, the recessions of 1982-83 and
the current recession which began in 1990, persistent long term
unemployment, an increase in single parent families, and the
ageing of the population placed added demands on the Com-
monwealth social security budget. Public concern about the
high rates of poverty, especially among children, and the need
to compensate workers with a social wage under the Accord
also contributed to pressures for increasing public social welfare
expenditures. These expansionary pressures conflicted with a
policy of budgetary restraint deemed necessary both to manage
the economy and to retain the support of the business commu-
nity. With the opposition calling for compulsory work for those
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drawing unemployment benefits and raising the spectre of the
dole bludger "working at a tan on the dole,"4 the government
sought to demonstrate a firm stance on welfare compliance. In
the 11 July 1987 election, with the opposition in disarray, Hawke
won the endorsement of leading financial and industrial lead-
ers for the government's "fiscal responsibility" (Maddox, 1989,
p. 48).
Social Security "Reform"
The government's objective was to revise social security,
increasing some benefits, especially to address child poverty
(which Hawke had rashly pledged to eliminate by 1990) while
holding the line on expenditures. Social security expenditures
were held to about 24 per cent of total budget outlays which
declined when adjusted for inflation (Howe, 1989b).
The government's approach to social security reform pro-
ceeded along three fronts:
- a reassessment and rationalization of social security pro-
grams through the Social Security Review;
- administrative improvements in the Department of Social
Security; and
- an increased emphasis on client compliance.
The Social Security Review. The guiding rationale for the
Social Security Review was to readjust programs in view of
changing demographic, economic and labour market conditions
(Cass, 1988), though some argued that the overriding emphasis
was on cost containment (Watts, 1990). The two objectives are
not necessarily inconsistent. Among the conditions that the Re-
view addressed were increased long term unemployment, the
increase in part-time work, the ageing of the population, and
the growth of single parent families.
The Social Security Review headed by social work profes-
sor Bettina Cass generated 31 background papers and 6 issue
papers, most of which were developed by Department of Social
Security staff under Dr. Cass' overall direction. Most of its rec-
ommendations were implemented from 1986 to 1991. Prominent
among the changes has been an increased targeting of payments
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and stepped-up monitoring and scrutiny of applications to re-
duce the risk of incorrect payments or fraud (Commonwealth
of Australia, 1989; Saunders and Whiteford, 1990).
Several of its recommendations narrowed the basis of enti-
tlements through increased targeting of benefits, extended wait-
ing periods before benefits commenced, and the imposition of
assets tests on benefits and the family allowance supplement,
and an income test on the family allowance. (The government
had introduced a pensions assets test prior to the review.) At the
same time, some payments were increased and most have now
been indexed for inflation. Brian Howe, then Minister for Social
Security, noting the improvements in benefit levels since 1983,
could claim, "We have rebuilt the safety net" (Howe, 1989a,
p. 1). But perhaps the most far reaching change was the ac-
tive labour market strategy that underlies the overall approach
and was the basis for a revamping of the unemployment ben-
efit. Under "Newstart", which took effect in November 1991,
those having received unemployment payments for 12 consec-
utive months or longer must now negotiate an "agreement"
with a Commonwealth Employment Service representative to
qualify for continued assistance. Originally called the "Active
Employment Strategy", the name was changed upon the recom-
mendation of the government's market researchers to suggest
something more affirmative and action-oriented than a "strat-
egy" to meet the growing unemployment; and the individual
"contract" was now called an "agreement", a term evoking a
more friendly, benign interaction. The "agreements" are to stip-
ulate activities, such as job search efforts, participation in train-
ing programs, or volunteer work, that will be undertaken as a
condition for continuing to receive unemployment payments.
The name changes were also in keeping with the recommen-
dations of the Social Security Review. It had called for renaming
employment programs to stress activity, to differentiate them
from "passive" welfare programs-e.g., STEP for the newly un-
employed, LEAP for those on benefit 12 months or longer, TAP
for older workers, and Job Search Allowance for the young un-
employed (Cass, 1988).
The rationale, set forth in the Review, was to help the grow-
ing numbers of long term unemployed maintain a connection
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with the labour force and if necessary, upgrade their skills. This
was in recognition of research showing that the longer one re-
mained unemployed, the less likely one's chances of ever being
rehired. Rather than relegating such individuals to permanent
dependency, the idea was to encourage them to seek training
and keep up an active job search (Cass, 1988).
A more cynical view was that the employment strategy was
a response to the Liberals' "... . dole stripping plan, whereby
everyone was taken off the dole after nine months, and only half
put on to 'special benefits' if they were sufficiently destitute, and
incapable of any sort of work.... The government appeared to
respond to the political pressure in its pre-election economic
statement" (Kingston, 1991). The problem was, however, that
the program came on line in the midst of Australia's most severe
recession in 20 years.
A staff bulletin identified Newstart's objectives as helping
the unemployed by: "changing income support from the passive
unemployment benefit into allowances which encourage active
job search and training; [and] making income support condi-
tional on co-operative self-help on the part of the client. This
'reciprocal obligation' will be set down in a contract." Another
goal was "to help identify those people who don't want to look
for work because they already have a job or for some other
reason." If clients failed "to respond well enough, this could
provide grounds for a breach of the Activity Test" (Department
of Education, Employment, and Training, 1990). The Common-
wealth Employment Service was given a quota of cases to be
purged from the rolls for various kinds of non-compliance. The
union responded with a job action based on concerns for staff
safety from disgruntled clients who were denied assistance or
who might otherwise object to the new procedures. The New-
start implementation task force promised to increase security,
provide "easy entry and exit for staff" from interview areas,
and "concealed buzzers fitted to desks" (Department of Educa-
tion, Employment, and Training, 1990).
The Department of Social Security also initiated a program,
Jobs, Education, and Training (JET), to assist sole parent pen-
sioners to get training and find work; and a new Child Support
Scheme to ensure that non-custodial parents contribute to the
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support of their children to the extent that they are able to do so.
Both programs were inspired by U.S. examples, Massachusetts'
"ET" (Employment and Training for single parents) and the Wis-
consin child support plan. In constrast to the U.S. JOBS program
in the U.S., JET is strictly voluntary. The highly successful Child
Support Scheme provides for formula-based, mandatory salary
deductions from the non-custodial parent collected throught the
Department of Taxation. There are income guarantees for the
children; and women on welfare, unlike their U.S. counterparts
benefit by keeping a substantial portion of the child support
income before their grants are reduced.
Administrative improvements. A number of major adminis-
trative improvements were also implemented. The decentralisa-
tion, or "devolution" of services has continued with the phasing
out of the state offices, thereby eliminating one administra-
tive layer between Canberra, the capital, and the regional (i.e.,
local) offices. There was a doubling of service locations from
150 in 1980 to 300 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1989). The
payment systems have been computerised, and highly sophis-
ticated, state-of-the-art management systems have been imple-
mented. While these systems have vastly improved central office
oversight, there has also been heavy stress on industrial democ-
racy and participatory decision making. Although service
delivery has been severely strained by caseload growth and staff
shortages, especially among the entry level ranks responsible for
client contact, staff positions have been upgraded, particularly
for administrators of regional (i.e., local) and area (i.e., super-
visory) offices; and considerable effort has been devoted to up-
grading skills through training as well as improved recruitment.
Senior management has strived, with considerable success,
to imbue staff with an appreciation for accountability, cost con-
tainment, and efficiency. As a result, there has been a decided
shift in the direction of more tightly administered payments.
This shift has also seen the implementation of numerous pol-
icy and procedural changes designed to limit the misuse of the
program and reduce the risk of improper payments being made.
Compliance policies. A number of compliance measures
have been introduced, especially since 1986. These have
included:
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* More stringent personal identification requirements.
" The introduction of the tax file number to facilitate identi-
fication of clients, and to make it more difficult to conceal
income or assets.
" Computer matching of client files to prevent duplicate
payments.
" A stepped up, risk-based review strategy, including:
mandated reviews of specific payment categories, com-
puter-assisted selection of cases at risk of incorrect pay-
ment, geographically-based saturation reviews by mobile
review teams, and numerous special review project ini-
tiatives carried out at the national, area and regional of-
fice levels. These have included, for example, checking
selected employer records against Department payment
rosters; and a recent project to match New Zealand so-
cial security files with Australia's to check for duplicate
payments.
" An information-sharing agreement with the Common-
wealth Taxation Office.
" Social security amnesties were declared in February-May
1986 and in October 1990. Persons receiving overpay-
ments could tell the Department without having to repay
or face prosecution, providing the original claim was gen-
uine and the overpayment was due to a failure to report a
change in circumstances. These amnesties served to clear
the books of a large number of costly overpayments while
the attendant publicity gave notice to clients of improved
methods of overpayment detection that were about to be
implemented. Some 14,000 persons came forward in 1986,
and 24,000 under the 1990 amnesty.
" Increased emphasis and improved methods for collecting
overpayments, including the establishment of specialised
debt collection teams.
There is always a tension in any public welfare program
between facilitating access to benefits on the one hand, and
safeguarding payments on the other (Goodin, 1985; Sanders,
1985). Compliance measures serve to reassure the public at large
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that payments are being fairly allocated. On the other hand,
an overly zealous search for "cheaters" may undermine the
program's legitimacy by reinforcing negative stereotypes. As
Goodin (1985) points out, increasing access may also increase
the likelihood of granting payments to those not eligible while
restricting access will impede assistance to legitimate claimants
as well as those not properly entitled. The challenge is to find
an appropriate balance.
Under the Labor government, the Department of Social Se-
curity shifted decidedly in the direction of restricting access and
policing the rolls. There are several complementary thrusts to
the overall strategy. The Department has sought to increase vol-
untary compliance. Voluntary compliance is both more accept-
able to the public and reduces administrative costs associated
with surveillance. It is contingent on public perceptions of the
fairness and legitimacy of programs, on the clarity of the rules,
the perceived and actual effectiveness of eligibility reviews, and
operative cultural norms about compliance. The Department
has also emphasised a deterrent approach such that clients who
may be tempted to misrepresent their circumstances are aware
of the risks and costs of detection. The emphasis on compliance
has helped restore the integrity of the program in the eyes of
the taxpaying public and has undercut to some extent Opposi-
tion efforts to exploit the issue. It is also consistent with efforts
to contain expenditures. On the other hand, compliance mea-
sures are not without costs-to clients, to the agency, and to
society at large. These compliance costs include encroachments
on privacy, increased procedural barriers that impede access
to benefits, and psychological costs, the stress and stigma of
clienthood.
Conclusions
So what has been accomplished by the reforms? The De-
partment of Social Security has indeed restored the integrity
of the payment system by implementing numerous manage-
ment improvements and compliance measures. There is, at least
formally, a good system of checks and balances that provides
clients with several alternative avenues of appeal against
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Departmental decisions: internally, to social workers, office
managers, and the Authorised Review Officers, a cadre of DSS
officials who are the first line of appeal for clients contesting DSS
rulings; and externally, through the independent Social Secu-
rity Appeals Tribunals, Administrative Appeals Tribunals, and
ultimately, to the Federal Court. Still other means of redress
are available through community groups, advocacy organisa-
tions and letters to Members of Parliament and to the Minister
for Social Security. All these appeal avenues, however, require
knowledge and initiative on the part of clients who are often
unaware of their rights.
With respect to income support, a study of family incomes
in the period from 1982-83 to 1989-90 showed that most Aus-
tralians, excepting farmers, experienced a decline in real income
when housing costs were taken into account. The very poor,
along with the very rich, however, made some advances. This
improvement for the poor was a result of increases in social
security family assistance payment levels and tax relief though
payments remain at about the poverty line. The average family
income situation would have been far worse, however, were it
not for an increase in two wage households (Bradbury, 1989).
And during the current recession, there has been a decided up-
turn in the poverty rate.
Social security in Australia works reasonably well for most
people, protecting them from the kind of abject destitution ex-
perienced by many in the U.S. It does less well at providing
an adequate living standard for those solely dependent upon it
for their livelihood. Furthermore, one consequence of the tar-
geting and the tightening of administrative procedures is that
some truly needy individuals fail to qualify for benefits. Some
are temporarily disadvantaged by the various waiting periods
attached to programs. Others, such as homeless youth, the men-
tally ill, and some chronic alcoholics and drug addicts may fall
within eligibility criteria, but be unable to satisfy the consider-
able documentary requirements. The tightened proof of identity
and domicile requirements are substantial barriers for persons
living on the streets or in shelters with no regular residence. He
or she may lack the kind of documents readily available to those
in a more stable environment: driver's license, birth certificate,
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passport, bank statements, lease, rent receipts, utility bills, etc.
The incidence of premeditated fraud is low, in part because of
the various measures taken by the Department to protect the
payment system. ( According to the Australian Auditor Gen-
eral (1992, pp. 65, 75) the average value of all social security
overpayments was $865; and 72% had a value of less than $500.
The number and value of overpayments represent 1.9% of all
beneficiaries and 0.45% of all benefit payments.) A high pro-
portion of what the Department identifies as incorrect payment
is attributable to the complexity of the rules, the Department's
failure to communicate its requirements clearly to clients, and
genuine differences over interpretations of complicated and am-
biguous eligibility criteria (McGregor and Harris, 1990; Penman,
1986; Weatherley, 1993). There is also a zone of contested eligi-
bility wherein a minority of otherwise honest clients feel justi-
fied not reporting small amounts of casual income, just within
or over the boundaries of the "free zone" where they are per-
mitted to keep income before it starts being deducted from their
grants; such clients justify minor nonreporting of income as nec-
essary to meet basic living needs since grant levels are so low
(Weatherley, 1993).
Some "fiddling" takes pressure off the state to raise so-
cial spending, and helps maintain social harmony, especially
in economically-stressed times. As Mattera (1985) noted about
the underground economy:
... what goes on in the underground is far from unrelated to what
is happening in the larger economy.., the phenomenon is inextri-
cably tied to the crisis of the economy at large.... A side activity
off the books has become an essential supplement to inadequate
income from the regular economy for some people and an essen-
tial supplement to inadequate unemployment or social security
benefits for others. (pp.13, 22-23).
A policy of total client compliance is not realistically achiev-
able, and would arguably be inconsistent with the norms of a
democratic society. Personal information on nearly a third of
Australia's population is contained in the Department of So-
cial Security's computers. Recent examples of misuse include
staff selling confidential recipient information to debt collection
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agencies, Department collusion with police to cut off unemploy-
ment beneficiaries who engaged in lawful political demonstra-
tions, and the disclosure, through computer error, of thousands
of confidential client files. The Department has narrowly fended
off proposals for integrating its client data base with that of the
national police, for cash bounties to those identifying cheats,
and for implementing case cancellation quotas for its staff re-
view officers. A Conservative government might have fewer
qualms about further encroachments upon the rights of Social
Security claimants.
The work test also poses vexing issues. As Saunders (1987)
has observed about the politics of unemployment benefits,
... whilst unemployment in general stems from factors external
to individuals, in individual cases it is more difficult to draw this
conclusion. Unlike other categories for whom income support is
available, individual unemployed people are more likely to be
suspected of choosing to enter that category.
As in the U.S., some politicians target the unemployed as
responsible for problems rooted in the macro economy. As one
commentator noted about the introduction of NEWSTART,
From 1 July, in the depths of a horrific recession with thousands of
Australians losing their jobs or unable to find their first, the Gov-
ernment will make it harder for many of them to get dole money
to live on. Today, the Government will introduce legislation for
the plan. In late June, it will spend $3 million on television and
print advertising to tell the unemployed the news that despite the
fact that there are virtually no jobs any more, they must pretend
there are and do all sorts of things to prove it (Kingston, 1991).
The official policy since 1985 has been to emphasise basic ed-
ucation and training, with job creation to be addressed through
macroeconomic policy instead of seeking to increase employ-
ment through direct job creation schemes. There is, however,
a considerable performance gap between the expressed aims
of the government policy and the commitment of resources
to implement it. In 1991-92, Australia ranked 20th out of the
21 OECD countries, immediately below the U. S., in expendi-
tures for active labour market programs. (Spain was number
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21.) Australia and the U. S. spent .03 percent of GDP for each 1
percent of its unemployed, compared with .51 percent for top-
ranking Sweden (OECD, 1993).
Furthermore, Australia has failed even to keep pace with
its own poor performance record. The 1989-90 expenditures on
training were at about half the level as in 1983-84 and 1984-85;
and still less as a percentage of unemployment benefits (Stretton
and Chapman, 1990). The government proposed a $260 million
increase in support for technical education and other training
schemes for 1992. But this actually represented a 20 per cent
reduction, in view of the increase in the number of unemployed
(Disney, 1991).
Ultimately, the Labor government was able to play both
ways with a crack down on "bludgers". It exploited the rhetoric
of reciprocal obligation in announcing its tough policy to make
the unemployed try harder to find jobs under the threat of
a cut off of benefits. But with unemployment running about
10 percent, it tread softly in implementing the policy. While
;many found themselves under closer scrutiny, relatively few
were cut off. Hence Labor preempted a major Opposition cam-
paign issue without alienating too many among its working
class constituency. To everyone's surprise-including the Labor
leadership-Labor was returned to office in 1993 despite the
dismal economic outlook. Figuring in the Opposition's defeat
were concerns that the conservatives would dismantle the pop-
ular Medicare program and would impose a value added tax, a
kind of national sales tax. And so the movement toward welfare
state universalism initiated by the Whitlam government twenty
years earlier has been reversed. Even so, Australia's welfare sys-
tem continues to provide a level of income security far above
the U.S.
Notes
1. dole-bludger, n. One who exploits the system of unemployment benefits by
avoding gainful employment. The Australian National Dictionary: A Dictio-
nary of Australianisms on Historical Principles, Melbourne, 1988. The term
also refers more generally to one considered to be recieving benefits to
which they are not entitled.
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2. This was an alleged conspiracy of Greek immigrants to obtain disability
benefits. The Commonwealth brought charges against 70 individuals, but
ultimately dropped the charges, apologised, and paid them compensation.
The claimants were found to have had legitimate disabilities qualifying
them for assistance (Atkinson, 1987).
3. The Age, 7 April 1984, as quoted in Jaensch (1989), p.9 7.
4. This quote is from a news headline in the 9-10 August, 1986 Australian,
p.1, cited by Maddox (1989, p. 127).
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